Refining $300. Otherwise, however, Landa failed to supply the contracted-for oil. 15 Globe Refining alleged a loss of $3,500. 16 It reached this amount by summing five distinct losses. First was the $900 it had to pay the railroad for transporting its cars to Landa's plant, an expense "of which the defendant had notice." 17 Second, the market price of cottonseed oil at the time of breach was $0.1875 per gallon, rising to $0.20 per gallon when Landa notified Globe Refining of breach and $0.25 when suit was brought; because Landa failed to give Globe Refining notice of breach, though, and because of "the disorganized condition of the market," Globe Refining was unable to cover at all. 18 Third, Landa, knowing that it was going to breach the contract, nevertheless "wrongfully caused, directed and instructed" Globe Refining to send its tank cars a distance of 1000 miles at an expense and loss to plaintiff of $1000, knowing at said time . . . that he would not fill said cars . . . and knowing that plaintiff would lose the use of said cars unnecessarily, and would lose much valuable time in arranging to procure other oil from other sources. 19 Relatedly, because Landa delayed giving notice for two weeks, and did so "wilfully and maliciously," Globe Refining was put to an avoidable loss of $2,000. 20 Fourth, because of Landa's breach, Globe Refining lost the use of its tanks for at least thirty days each, which, at a cost of three dollars per day, yielded $700 in damages. 21 Fifth, Globe Refining had already contracted to sell the cottonseed oil to its own customers, "whereby it was subjected to the heavy damage and loss of $740, thereby losing said customers and contracts, and suffering the loss of its credit and reputation to its damage in the further sum of $1,000." 22 Finally, the parties contemplated that Globe Refining would have to arrange to send its tanks at great expense from distant points, and that doing so would require Globe Refining to pay additional freight "in order to rearrange the destination of the various tanks" in the sum of $350. 23 The defendant sought dismissal on the grounds of a lack of diversity jurisdiction, stating that the amount in question was below the jurisdictional requirement of $2,000. 24 Let us pause here. Suppose this case were to come before a modern district court judge, with the defendant alleging a lack of jurisdiction as a basis for dismissal. The court might well read the complaint and conclude, as did Justice Holmes, that "the pleader has gone as far as he dared to go, and to the verge of anything that could be justified under the contract, if not beyond." 25 But that is not the test. Modern courts ask whether it is legally certain that the plaintiff 15 Id. 16 How Globe Refining reached this figure is rather mysterious. If one adds up its various demands, they come to approximately $7,700. 17 R. at 2. 18 R. at 3. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 R. at 4. 22 Id. 23 R. at 4-5. 24 R. at 8. The diversity statute then in force was 24 Stat. 582 (1887). 25 Globe Ref. Co. v . Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 542 (1903) . cannot meet the jurisdictional minimum. 26 Even if the judge thinks it highly unlikely that the plaintiff will recover that much, the judge is not to usurp the fact-finder's right to make that decision. There are, however, three circumstances in which it is possible to show to a legal certainty that the plaintiff will not meet the jurisdictional minimum. These are:
(1) when the terms of a contract limit the plaintiff's possible recovery to less than the required jurisdictional amount; (2) when a specific rule of substantive law or measure of damages limits the amount of money recoverable by the plaintiff to less than the necessary number of dollars to satisfy the requirement; and (3) when independent facts show that the amount of damages claimed has been inflated by the plaintiff merely to secure federal court jurisdiction. 27 Only the third applies here. To be sure, the claims are duplicative. But that does not of itself destroy jurisdiction, if the residue passes the jurisdictional minimum. The judge would then look at the complaint and any facts introduced into evidence during a hearing on the motion to dismiss. In Globe Refining, the court would, I think, quickly decide that there is jurisdiction, though probably with some mental reservations about the likelihood of recovering that much. The direct damages-the difference between the market price at the time and place of delivery and the contract price-according to the plaintiff's figures were $1441.60, well short of the necessary $2000. Of the other claims for damages, some were incidental damages, such as the costs of transporting the tank cars, and some were consequential damages, such as the lost business because of Globe Refining's inability to supply its own customers. The incidental claims do overlap. For example, the plaintiff sought $900 for payments made to the railroad for moving its tank cars to Landa's plant, but also sought $1000 because Landa caused Globe to send its cars a thousand miles, $350 to rearrange the destination of its tanks, and $700 for loss of use of the tanks. Indeed, as Holmes properly observed, some of these are legally incapable of recovery. The market-contract measure of damages takes into account the routine costs of performance by the buyer, which would have been incurred had the contract been performed. The goal of expectation is to put the breached-against party in the position it would have occupied had the contract been performed. In this setting, that would give Globe Refining full tank cars of oil at Landa's plant. The expenses involved in getting the cars to the plant are thus irrelevant. 28 The consequential claims overlap as well. The plaintiff asked for $2000 for losses incurred because Landa's lack of notice made it impossible for Globe to supply itself from other sources, but also $1740 for lost customers, credit, and reputation. 29 But even if the judge had completely disregarded the inciden- 26 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) ("It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal."). 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 14AA FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3713 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 28 However, added expenses would potentially be recoverable. Had Globe Refining covered, for example, any added shipping costs would qualify as incidental damages. Even under the circumstances, Globe Refining could recover costs beyond those anticipated at the time of contracting. The complaint does not make clear whether there were any, or, if so, under which heading they might fall. 29 Globe Ref. Co ., 190 U.S. at 542.
tal damages and chose the lower figure for consequential damages, those damages, added to the $1441.60 in direct damages, would safely have exceeded $2000.
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A turn-of-the-last-century court would have conducted the same analysis. In the words of a leading treatise, where the alleged cause of action is one in which the law does not liquidate the damages, the amount for which the plaintiff demands judgment is alone to be considered, unless it clearly appears that the amount named is merely colorable, and beyond the amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery. 31 In the leading opinion when Holmes wrote Globe Refining, the Court laid down what remains the test. Even should the judge receive impressions amounting to a moral certainty that [the cause] does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the court . . . upon such a personal conviction, however strong, he would not be at liberty to act, unless the facts on which the persuasion is based, when made distinctly to appear on the record, create a legal certainty of the conclusion based on them. 32 Furthermore, "[i]t has been said that the burden of proof that the matter in dispute is less than the jurisdictional amount, when the plaintiff's pleading alleges that fact, rests upon the defendant." 33 30 There is one important caveat here. Before the litigation Globe Refining sent Landa Cotton Oil a bill for $1021.28. R. at 23-24. This is flatly inconsistent with its later insistence that its damages exceeded $2000. Globe Refining might have chosen to make a modest demand early on, but a more complete one in litigation. It might also not have realized the full scope of its potential damages until it consulted a lawyer, assuming it did so for the first time after sending the letter. The uncharitably inclined might conclude that Globe Refining thought its real damages something like the smaller figure, and put the other items in its complaint purely in order to secure diversity jurisdiction-precisely the sort of behavior that vitiates pleadings that otherwise seem sufficient. See George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225 REV. , 1333 REV. (1994 . Certainly the bill supports a finding of fraudulent pleading, an argument vigorously made by the defendant. But without more it ought not defeat diversity jurisdiction, unless the facts presented yield the legal certainty that the jurisdictional minimum cannot be attained. 31 1 ROGER FOSTER, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL PRACTICE § 16, at 49 (3d ed. 1901) (footnote omitted). 32 Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 559 (1886). Naturally, were the complaint facially defective, the amount claimed in the ad damnum clause would not preserve jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lee v. Watson, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 337, 339 (1863) ("In an action upon a money demand, where the general issue is pleaded, the matter in dispute is the debt claimed, and its amount, as stated in the body of the declaration, and not merely the damages alleged, or the prayer for judgment at its conclusion, must be considered in determining the question whether this court can take jurisdiction on a writ of error sued out by the plaintiff."); BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 121 (2d ed. rev. & enlarged by Henry Childs Newman 1896) ("If, indeed, it is apparent on the plaintiff's own showing, in his declaration or bill, that, even if he should prevail, the law could not give him a sum equal to the jurisdictional amount, the court will not take jurisdiction; but, on the other hand, if the sum recoverable is indefinite, then the plaintiff may fix it in his declaration or bill at an amount which it is morally impossible for him to recover."). 33 1 FOSTER, supra note 31, §16 at 56-57; see also Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U.S. 165, 174 (1883) ("It is undoubtedly true that until it is in some way shown by the record that the sum demanded is not the matter in dispute, that sum will govern in all questions of jurisdiction, but it is equally true that when it is shown that the sum demanded is not the real matter in dispute, the sum shown, and not the sum demanded, will prevail.").
So before Globe Refining and after Globe Refining there should have been no trouble finding jurisdiction. True, the trial judge here dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction, stating merely its conclusion "that the real matter in controversy clearly does not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) and that more than that sum is claimed by plaintiff for the fraudulent purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the court." 34 No doubt the court was moved by the plaintiff's overegging of the pudding. Many of its alleged losses were, after all, duplicative or simply unrecoverable. But not all, and not enough to warrant dismissal. Hence the apparently justified appeal.
So in light of the established law, why didn't the Court find jurisdiction in Globe Refining? Because Holmes's opinion, in the words of a leading damages scholar, "seems almost perverse in its anxiety to make all intendments against the pleader in order to reach its doctrinal point."
35 For example, consider the lost business resulting from the breach. The demand is clearly duplicative; Globe Refining cannot receive damages both for Landa's malicious failure to tell it of its intended breach, thus causing an unnecessary loss, and for Landa's failure to perform, thus causing losses arising from contracts, actual or potential, with its customers. But Holmes tossed out both-remember, at the pleading stage. For the first, he said that "[t]he fact alleged has no relation to the time of the contract. Therefore it cannot affect the damages, the measure of which was fixed at that time." 36 This is partly legitimate. The test for foreseeability looks to the time of the contract, not after, to determine whether an event was foreseeable. And, as Holmes properly added, motives are irrelevant for breach of contract, though they might be germane for some tort action not in this complaint. 37 So far, Holmes is guilty of no more than an unsympathetic reading of the complaint. Globe Refining alleged that because Landa failed to give it timely notice of breach, it incurred damages. That essentially seeks damages for a failure to mitigate. Were there a duty to mitigate, such a count might be understandable. But there is none, so failure to mitigate goes to the measure of damages, not breach. If Globe Refining meant that the delay caused damages above and beyond those caused by the breach, then without more we cannot be sure whether Globe Refining counted the same damages twice.
Fine. So Globe Refining was sloppy at best in that first count. But what about the second, in which it alleged that Landa's breach cost it profits from resale and losses of customers and goodwill? That seems unexceptionable in the face of the alleged actual notice. Here Holmes went off the jurisdictional rails. He reasoned that Globe Refining had put its case "as high as it possibly can be put."
38 From this he concluded that the complaint consisted of allegations "which, by declining to amend, the plaintiff has admitted it cannot reinforce."
39 Globe Refining had alleged that its contracts with others were well known to Landa and that "defendant had contracted to that end with the plain-34 R. at 16. 35 tiff." 40 On its face that would seem sufficient-but not for Holmes. Rather than paraphrase, let's let him speak for himself:
Whether, if we were sitting as a jury, this would warrant an inference that the defendant assumed an additional liability, we need not consider. It is enough to say that it does not allege the conclusion of fact so definitely that it must be assumed to be true. With the contract before us it is in a high degree improbable that any such conclusion could have been made good. 41 Where to start? First, Holmes weirdly reasoned that because the complaint pushed the limits for what the plaintiff might seek, its failure to amend the complaint to provide more detailed allegations meant that it had nothing more to say. This is at best a non sequitur. One might take a kitchen-sink approach to pleading and nevertheless not provide all possible detail for any one count. From that dubious proposition Holmes decided that whether a jury might find liability was not pertinent. Really? If the test is one of legal certainty, I would have thought that if a jury might plausibly find for the plaintiff on the basis of the pleadings, there is no legal certainty that the pleadings are inadequate. And then Holmes piled Pelion upon Ossa when he stated that the complaint "does not allege the conclusion of fact so definitely that it must be assumed to be true." 42 This effectively imposed a heightened pleading standard on Globe Refining, which flatly contradicts the looser approach generally applied by the Court when faced with disputes over jurisdictional amounts. Such a standard did not exist at the time of Globe Refining and did not exist after.
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So Holmes is correct that a bizarrely uncharitable reading of the allegations yields a victory for Landa. But, of course, that isn't the test, and it wasn't the test when Holmes wrote Globe Refining. The allegations are at the very least consistent with Landa's actual knowledge at the time of contracting that Globe Refining was going to lose profits and customers if Landa breached, and that should have been enough. 44 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Professor Cohen has advanced a cogent argument in favor of Holmes. If cover is not possible, then consequential damages are indeed available for breach, subject to Hadley and allied doctrines. But if cover is possible but not undertaken, then any consequential damages arising from the lack of goods cannot be recovered by the buyer, because those damages could have been mitigated and were not. Cohen, supra note 30, at 1338-41; cf. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (2002) ("Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include (a) any loss . . . which could not reasonably be prevented by cover . . . . "). And there was testimony to the effect that Globe Refining could have covered, albeit at an undesirable price, but did not. R. at 26 (Bill of Exceptions Nos. 2 & 3). The testimony was, however, equivocal, and the trial court made no finding on relative credibility. Under the circumstances, the Court would have been justified in remanding for further proceedings. It would also have been justified in pointing to the mixed evidence to conclude that Globe Refining's claims, though improbable, were not below the jurisdictional amount to a legal certainty. It was not justified in using improbability to justify dismissal. 44 To be sure, the Court had recently issued an opinion that superficially gave support to As I noted at the end of the last section, Globe Refining's allegations should have been enough to meet the jurisdictional minimum. More precisely, they would have been enough had Holmes applied the Hadley rule in an orthodox manner. Instead Holmes marched in a different direction, one adopted in a line of English cases but without any substantial support in the United States. How Holmes got to this rather lonely outpost, and why its isolation is entirely deserved, is the subject of this section.
We left Holmes in the middle of eviscerating Globe Refining's complaint. He properly brushed aside some elements of damages and less properly brushed away others-less properly because the plaintiff's allegations, read as they were supposed to be read in this posture, were sufficient to count toward the jurisdictional minimum. The main issue remaining was whether Globe Refining could recover damages for the lost profits on resale of the cottonseed oil and for lost business resulting from its downstream breaches. Here his method of reading the complaint was . . . well, imaginative would be one word for it. Absurd would be another. But Holmes then managed to cap his tower of error by stating that "it is in a high degree improbable that any such conclusion [that the defendant assumed an additional liability] could have been made good." 45 This is problematic because the Hadley test, as conventionally stated, does not require that the promisor have assumed additional liability. It is enough that of time for each day since his return; (d) $3 per day for what he would have earned had he not left Seattle at all; (e) $15 per day for his future earnings in Dawson City; and (f) the value of his lost baggage. The Court acknowledged that in determining jurisdiction one starts with the amount that the plaintiff claims. "But where the plaintiff asserts, as his cause of action, a claim which he cannot be legally permitted to sustain by evidence, a mere ad damnum clause will not confer jurisdiction . . . ." Id. at 267. The Court then observed that most of the damages sought were remote at best. As the Court put it:
The plaintiff was traveling to a land of promise, hoping to there procure some occupation, he knew not what, or to engage in some business, he knew not what. The result of such an adventure cannot be foretold, and the plaintiff's anticipations afford no safe ground on which to base a claim for damages.
Id. So here the Court made judgments about the plausibility of the plaintiff's claims in the course of deciding whether the plaintiff had met the jurisdictional amount-very like Holmes's actions in Globe Refining.
Or was it? If one looks more closely at the complaint in Morrison, the cases turn out to be quite different. In Morrison, the plaintiff did not allege that he had ever lived in Dawson City before, or had any previous engagement or business there or any promise of employment; that it was not alleged what, if any, occupation the plaintiff had before his departure on the journey, nor what occupation was expected at the point of destination, or that any expected occupation or employment was communicated to the defendant company.
Id. So the complaint in Morrison consisted of bare allegations, lacking any factual predicate for finding proximate cause and foreseeability. Even the most generous court in the world would not have been able to scrape together the allegations necessary to show the jurisdictional amount. In contrast, Globe Refining did make appropriate allegations; they just weren't good enough for Holmes. Furthermore, the chain of causation set forth by Morrison was attenuated, to say the least, which is not true of that in Globe Refining. 45 Globe Refining, 190 U.S. at 546. the damages either flow in the natural course of events from the breach or, if not, that they arise from circumstances that, though not in the ordinary course of events, were made known to the promisor at the time of contracting. It certainly was not necessary that the defendant have agreed expressly to assume the risk in question-certainly not in American case law, and not in the main strand of English case law and commentary.
Here Holmes reframed the Hadley rule in a way that has ensured the continued notoriety of Globe Refining. He first acknowledged that contracting parties contemplate performance, not breach, when they make their contracts. 46 But the contracts effectively allocate risk, whether the parties consider it directly or not. Holmes therefore stated that "the extent of liability in such cases is likely to be within [the promisor's] contemplation, and, whether it is or not, should be worked out on terms which it fairly may be presumed he would have assented to if they had been presented to his mind." 47 He added that "mere notice to a seller of some interest or probable action of the buyer is not enough necessarily and as matter of law to charge the seller with special damage on that account if he fails to deliver the goods." 48 The test thus reframed, Globe Refining still did not have to lose, but its loss was very much on the cards. Consider, for example, Holmes's dismissal of the claim for loss of use of the tanks that Globe Refining had already sent to Landa's plant. Holmes acknowledged that this "was alleged to have been in contemplation of the contract, if we give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt in construing a somewhat confused sentence." 49 Ordinarily we would stop here and count the claim as foreseeable under the second prong of the Hadley test. But Holmes goes on to say that "this ambiguous expression cannot be taken to mean more than notice, and notice of a fact which would depend upon the accidents of the future." 50 Well, now. Under then-standard procedure, Holmes should have read the allegations generously. Even so, Holmes pooh-poohed them as nothing more than notice. That would have sufficed, as we will see, under the prevailing interpretations of Hadley. Nor was the fact of potential loss, rather than actual loss, pertinent-indeed, losses resulting from uncertain 46 Id. at 543. 47 Id. 48 Id. at 545. 49 Id. at 546. The sentence Holmes referred to appears only in part in Globe Refining. Id. at 542-43. The pertinent part reads:
Plaintiff further alleges that in asking for the shipment of said oil, plaintiff was under the necessity of arranging to send and sending at great expense its tanks from distant points, the defendant's said mills to receive such oil, all of which was well known to defendant, and in contemplation of the aforesaid contract, and-was well understood by both plaintiff and defendant that at the time of making and entering into said contract that plaintiff was required to pay additional freight in order to rearrange the destination of the various tanks and other points . . . . R. at 6. This sentence is hardly a model of clarity. In particular, it is not entirely clear whether the parties were aware of this as part of their contemplation of the contract at the time the contract was made, or whether these expenses were incurred after in Globe Refining's contemplation of the contract. Elsewhere in the complaint, though, Globe Refining makes clear that it charges Landa Cotton Oil with knowing of these expenses at the time of contracting and that it made those contracts in order to perform the contract with Landa. R. at 3. 50 Globe Refining, 190 U.S. at 546.
states of the world are at the core of foreseeability analysis. So by narrowing the Hadley test, Holmes was able to set aside an otherwise adequately pleaded demand for damages. But how did he get to this rule? First, one place from which he didn't get to the rule: the defendant's brief. It is easy to review the defendant/appellee's brief to the United States Supreme Court: there wasn't one. Nor was there a brief at the district court. The closest thing to a brief on this issue is the defendant's exceptions to the plaintiff's first amended petition. 51 That does indeed address foreseeability. But the exceptions do not question the Hadley test or propose any variation on them. Rather, the exceptions take issue with the plaintiff's pleadings, arguing that they "did not state that any notice of such special damage was given to defendant at or before the time of making the contract sued upon." 52 True, there was oral argument at the trial court, and in the absence of a transcript we can only speculate about what the parties might have argued. But on the basis of the record as it came to Holmes, the parties seem not to have challenged the traditional Hadley rule. Even leaving aside whether the defendant had preserved this issue at trial or, by not filing a brief with the Court, had waived it, Holmes could have drawn no inspiration in resolving this issue from counsel. Of course, the tacit agreement test could have been so obvious a part of American law that Holmes would hardly have needed any warrant from trial. But was it?
A. The Tacit Agreement Test in the United States: Not Just Tacit, But Silent
In Globe Refining, Holmes cited to few American cases on foreseeability, and all but one of those few were part of a string cite after a statement of the Hadley rule. 53 Certainly he cited to none in support of his version of the tacit agreement test. There is a reason for this omission. The cases aren't there to be cited. True, a number of courts had made statements along lines congenial to Holmes in the decades preceding Globe Refining, sometimes denying consequential damages in spite of clear notice, sometimes requiring something like the tacit agreement test. These decisions were cited to often by commenta-51 R. at 14. 52 Id. (1869), cited to for the unremarkable and essentially irrelevant proposition that the second prong of the Hadley test could be met by oral evidence, even when the contract was in writing. Globe Refining, 190 U.S. at 544. Just as well, perhaps, that Holmes didn't use Messmore any further. That court was faced with a breached contract for the sale of bullets-in 1861, when bullets were in some demand-with the result that it had to breach its own contract for resale. The court held that the usual contract-market damage rule is changed when the vendor knows that the purchaser has an existing contract for a re-sale at an advanced price, and that the purchase is made to fulfill such contract, and the vendor agrees to supply the article to enable him to fulfill the same, because those profits which would accrue to the purchaser upon fulfilling the contract of re-sale, may justly be said to have entered into the contemplation of the parties in making the contract. The case turned on whether the miscarried telegram was so equivocal that damages could not be proven with sufficient certainty (it was).
61 But on the way to that conclusion, the Court dealt with a foreseeability argument thus: "the loss of a market may be made an element of damages against a carrier for delay in delivery, where it was understood, either expressly or from the circumstances of the case, that the object of delivery was to get the benefit of the market." 62 A far cry from the tacit agreement test, surely. Civ. App. 1900) (for consequential damages, "it is essential that the carrier should understand the extent of the responsibility he assumes, and the consequences of failure on his part to deliver the goods within the required time; and, if no special circumstances are communicated to him, he can only be held responsible for the consequences which might ordinarily be supposed to flow from his breach of the contract"); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gilbert, 23 S.W. 320, 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893) ("If the facts and circumstances put the carrier upon notice, or conveyed to it knowledge of the purpose and intended use of the machine, then it would become liable for the damages that may result to the shipper as a consequence of delay . . . .").
Holmes's own court was somewhat ambivalent on the issue. One sees statements that special damages may not be recovered "unless the special circumstances which made it reasonable to expect that the greater damage would naturally ensue were, at the time when the contract was made, within the knowledge of both parties." Lonergan v. Waldo, 60 N.E. 479, 480 (Mass. 1901). On the other hand, one sees statements that damages of that sort could be recovered where the defendant knew of the special circumstances "and that the contract was made for the very purpose of preventing [ 64 There the plaintiffs delivered crates containing machinery to the defendant, a carrier, for delivery to a sawmill under construction. 65 When the ship's master, a part-owner of the ship, agreed to carry the crates, he knew that they contained machinery intended for the construction of a sawmill. 66 The carrier lost one of the crates, so the mill could not be completed until replacements were sent from England to Vancouver, which took over eleven months, during which the mill-owners lost potential profit. 67 The defendant sought to limit its damages to the cost of replacement (that is, to exclude consequential damage). 68 The Court of Common Pleas ruled for the defendant. 69 The reasons given, however, varied. Chief Justice Bovill applied conventional Hadley analysis to find that the defendant did not know enough to make it liable for special damages. 70 The defendant knew that the missing box contained part of the machinery for the mill; it did not know that the mill otherwise could not be operated, thus subjecting it to possible liability for the mill's closure. 71 In the principal opinion, though, Justice Willes went much further. He agreed that the defendant lacked full notice, adding that it did not know that the part could not be replaced save by shipment from England. 72 But he rested his opinion on the idea that if this potential liability "had been presented to the mind of the shipowner at the time of making the contract, as the basis upon which he was contracting, he would at once have rejected it." 73 Although the ship-owner knew the purpose of the shipment, "the mere fact of knowledge cannot increase the liability. The knowledge must be brought home to the party sought to be charged, under such circumstances that he must know that the person he contracts with reasonably believes that he accepts the contract with the special condition attached to it." 74 To decide this requires looking at what facts the promisor had and did not have, but knowledge "can only be evidence . . . of an understanding by both parties that the contract is based upon the circumstances which are communicated." 75 Holmes found this language most congenial, and quoted from it at length in Globe Refining.
Nettleship gave rise to a line of similar cases. For example, in Horne v.
Midland Railway Company
77 the court reviewed a decision by Justice Willes that relied on his opinion in Nettleship. The court affirmed Willes, and the opinion by Justice Blackburn is often referred to as the holding of the case. That opinion did not refer to Nettleship, but followed the same path and even extended it a bit: in Justice Blackburn's words, "in order that the notice may have any effect, it must be given under such circumstances, as that an actual contract arises on the part of the defendant to bear the exceptional loss."
78 Nor were the commentators silent. Willes's approach in Nettleship was ringingly affirmed in a leading English damages treatise, Mayne on Damages.
79 And again Holmes quoted approvingly. 80 But there was another line of English cases, one flatly contrary to Nettleship and the like. As a future Lord Chancellor observed:
[I]f the liability to pay damages for breach of contract in truth rests on the duty to contemplate certain results, a man who contracts with knowledge imposing upon him the duty of such contemplation does in fact agree to be liable within the limits covered by his knowledge. The law says he is liable if he contemplates the results of breach; notice of the circumstances made it his duty to contemplate such results. 82 The plaintiffs contracted with the defendant to make part of a pile-driver, which the plaintiffs told the defendant was needed by its client by the end of August. 83 The defendant instead tendered the part at the end of September, and the plaintiffs rejected it as untimely. 84 As a result of this tardy delivery, the plaintiffs alleged that they lost their profit on the sale of the pile-driver, the costs incurred in making the other parts of the machine, the cost of painting it in order to preserve it, and the cost of warehousing it. 85 Because the pile-driver was specially designed for the plaintiff's client, the part that was complete was otherwise merely scrap iron. 86 At trial the court awarded all the damages save the cost of warehousing. 87 To reach this result, the court had to determine that the plaintiffs' notice was sufficient to place the risk of non-performance of the main contract upon the defendant, a foreseeability question squarely within the second prong of conventional Hadley analysis. where the contractee states that he wants the article agreed to be made in order to help him to carry out another contract, the contractor if he commits a breach in the delivery of the article is liable for the loss sustained by the contractee if he becomes unable to carry out that other contract.
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It was not necessary that the parties agree, tacitly or otherwise, that the defendant assume the risk; as long as both parties "know and contemplate that if a breach of the contract is committed some injury will accrue, in addition to the natural and ordinary consequences of the breach, the person committing the breach will be liable to give compensation in damages upon the occurrence of that injury." 92 The other opinions in the case were to the same effect: that notice of the special circumstances was sufficient to put on the defendant the risk that the plaintiffs would be unable to perform their contract if the defendant did not perform its contract.
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McHaffie was not alone. Consider, for example, the Court of Appeal decision in Grébert-Borgnis v. J. & W. Nugent. 94 Here the aggrieved buyer sued for damages resulting from the loss of its resale contract, a contract made known to the seller before the buyer and seller entered into their own contract. 95 The buyer sought its lost profit; the seller sought to avoid that loss by invoking foreseeability doctrine. 96 The Court of Appeal ruled unanimously for the buyer. 97 In And there is a structural dimension to these cases. The British judicial system underwent much change in the late nineteenth century. In particular, the Judicature Act of 1875 reorganized the appellate courts, eliminating appeals within the several divisions of the trial courts and substituting a Court of Appeal. 99 The panels of the Court of Exchequer that heard Hadley and Horne were among the courts thus supplanted, as was the panel of the Court of Common Pleas that heard Nettleship. 100 
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C. Why the Tacit Agreement Test? And Why Here?
So Holmes's use of the tacit agreement test was hardly dictated by precedent; American case law was almost entirely against him, and English case law and commentary was at best divided. So why adopt it? Obviously not because the tacit agreement test fit best with the rest of the common law. Instead, Holmes had his own special approach to contracting, one that dictated something like a tacit agreement test as part of the law of damages. As Holmes famously observed in The Path of the Law:
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference.
parties knew at the time of contracting is relevant to construing their agreement, but "is not necessarily conclusive"; instead, the court "is to work out, from what is expressly said and done, what would have been said with regard to events not definitely before the minds of the parties, if those events had been considered." 105 Holmes thus approved of Nettleship and disparaged the idea that "if, in the course of performance of the contract the promisor should be notified of any particular consequence which would result from its not being performed, he should be held liable for that consequence in the event of nonperformance." 106 Holmes's amoral views of contracting have been the subject of much commentary, and I do not propose either to add to it or to attempt to sum it up. Certainly his views are consistent with the economic approach to law, at least in its most neo-classical form. It is not coincidental that when Richard Posner, the high priest of law and economics, put together an anthology of Holmes's writings, he included Globe Refining. 107 In 1903, Holmes's abolition of duty, as conventionally considered, was not much followed. In the United States it has been rejected by most of those who do not employ the economic analysis of law.
108 In Britain it "has been regarded by virtually all as a brilliant but wholly unsound paradox."
109 To be sure, Holmes's approach does clear away some cobwebs, as he intended, and forces us to look closely at what exactly we mean by a contractual duty. But as a source of positive law, it has had fairly modest effect.
Consider, then, a part of Globe Refining that I have not mentioned until now. After Holmes stated the facts and allegations but before he began picking away at them, he laid out a compressed view of his theory of contract. (Not so compressed, really; it fills almost a page of the U.S. Reports.
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) We find his comparison of contract with tort. We find his view that contract is merely an election to perform or pay damages. 111 We find his corollary that whether a contract transfers a risk becomes an issue of construction. We find his conclusion that the issue is whether the terms "may be presumed [that the promisor] would have assented to if they have been presented to his mind."
112 Or, more pointedly, whether the plaintiff should recover in this case "depends on what liability the defendant fairly may be supposed to have assumed consciously, or 105 Id. at 303. 106 Id. at 301 (referring to Nettleship as "the opinion of a very able judge, which seems to be generally followed"). Note that Holmes puts up a straw man. Practically no one contended that notice after contract formation could give rise to liability. The real question was whether notice before or during contract formation could do so. 107 to have warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, when the contract was made." 113 This dissertation on the principles of contract law is a little out of place in a routine diversity case. Indeed, it even was a little out of keeping with Holmes's decisions on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, from which he had only just come. 114 Holmes had not been a remarkably venturesome contracts judge when in Massachusetts, though from time to time he did depart from well-trodden paths. Possibly Holmes was taking advantage of his new position to expound more generally on the nature of the law. But there is, I think, another explanation, one less jurisprudential and more personal.
As I noted, the English reaction to Holmes's theory of contract was less than overwhelming. Perhaps the most pertinacious of his opponents was Sir Frederick Pollock, Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, editor of The Law Quarterly Review, editor-in-chief of The Law Reports, and author of the leading English treatise on torts and one of the leading English treatises on contracts.
115 Pollock's contracts treatise states his commonsensical view that
[a] man who bespeaks a coat of his tailor will scarcely be persuaded that he is only betting with the tailor that such a coat will not be made and delivered . . . within a certain time. What he wants and means to have is the coat, not an insurance against not having a coat.
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A promisee is thus entitled, not merely to the promisor's election of performance or damages, but to performance, with damages as a remedy if the promisor fails in his duty. Pollock was also one of Holmes's oldest friends, as shown in their long and affectionate correspondence. 117 A running theme of their exchanges was their profound difference in the role of duty in contract, particularly its application to damages. Indeed, Pollock pressed this point for over fifty years-from his very first letter to Holmes in 1874, well before Holmes had published The Common Law, to a letter in 1927. 118 Thus, for example, Pollock pointing out to Holmes that Holmes's approach is inconsistent with the existence of the tort of inducing a breach of contract 119 or specific performance. 120 Most vigorous was Pollock's last attack: 113 Id. at 544. 114 1881) ; see also FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 3 (6th ed. 1894) ("The specific mark of contract is the creation of a right, not to a thing, but to another man's conduct in the future. He who has given the promise is bound to him who accepts it, not merely because he had or expressed a certain intention, but because he so expressed himself as to entitle the other party to rely on his acting in a certain way."). 117 See generally HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). If the promise in a contract were held to be in the alternative-perform or pay damages-then (1) there could be no decrees for specific performance: (2) there would be no reason for allowing any implied exception of frustration or the like: (3) (and chiefly) it would not answer reasonable expectations of promisees. Those are my reasons: I don't see where moral phraseology comes in. No doubt it might be the law in some other planet. 121 On foreseeability in particular, Pollock stated that the tacit agreement test would "cast doubt on the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale" and on the more general concept that the range of liability for breach of contract encompasses that which is "a natural and probable consequence of the act . . . the judgment of what is natural and probably being taken as it would have been formed by a reasonable man in the defendant's place at the . . . conclusion of the contract." What are we to make of this? Perhaps Holmes is playfully mentioning to Pollock that he had indeed made his views public, in nothing less than a judicial opinion. Or did Holmes decide to take the next chance he could to respond to Pollock, whether the facts really warranted it or not? It is easy to make too much of a few sentences in a letter, but one gets the sense of a bit of oneupsmanship in Holmes's phrasing-just a little bit of "neener, neener, neener," perhaps. One would hate to think that Holmes's opinion was driven significantly by his desire to make a jurisprudential point independent of the merits of a case, but under the circumstances it is hard to resist that conclusion. 120 Letter from Frederick Pollock to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (July 3, 1874) 
D. What's So Bad About Tacit Agreement?
Well, so what if Holmes wrote Globe Refining out of a desire to best a friend in debate? He might nevertheless have stated a sound legal principle, applied sensibly to the facts before him. Using what we might call an objective test of opinion assessment, was this a bad decision? Obviously I think it was, or you have been led here under false pretenses. More to the point, we can reach that conclusion using any of a wide range of jurisprudential approaches.
The two most obvious are both appeals to authority-namely, whether Globe Refining has been accepted by commentators or followed by courts. It is fair to say that the contracts clerisy long ago rejected Globe Refining, a rejection if anything rendered more emphatic over time. Consider, for example, Samuel Williston. In his magisterial contracts treatise, he stated that asserting the tacit agreement theory "is to assert a fiction which obscures the truth and invites misapprehension which may lead to error."
126 Or Arthur Corbin, who criticized Holmes's history 127 and declared that foreseeability "does not require that the defendant should have had the resulting injury actually in contemplation or should have promised either impliedly or expressly to pay therefor in case of breach."
128 Or Allan Farnsworth, who observed that it "has been generally rejected as overly restrictive and doctrinally unsound."
129 Or Karl Llewellyn, who wrote that Holmes's "Globe Refining opinion started out after the mirage of 'perfect compensation, not a penny more,' and came out with as harsh a result as could a commercial woodenhead."
130 Or Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, which expressly casts it aside.
131 Or the Restate-ment (Second) of Contracts, which does the same. 132 Or the Restatement of Contracts, which does the same, albeit less bluntly. 133 Or, for that matter, most English courts and commentators, whose early opinions and statements provided practically all of the doctrinal support for Globe Refining. 134 Nor have the courts ultimately adopted Globe Refining's tacit agreement test, though, again as shown below, there are some distressing exceptions. 135 The simplistic positivist might be willing to stop here, content with proof that Globe Refining is not the law in the great majority of the common-law 132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §351 cmt. a (1981) ("Furthermore, the party in breach need not have made a 'tacit agreement' to be liable for the loss."); see also id. at rptr's note to cmt. a ("This Comment rejects the 'tacit agreement' test of Globe Ref. Co . . . ." (emphasis added)). 133 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §330 cmt. a (1933) ("One who has committed a breach of contract is bound to pay damages only for such injury as he had reason to foresee when he made the contract. This does not mean, however, that the defendant must have had the resulting injury actually in contemplation or that he promised either impliedly or expressly to pay therefor in case of breach."). 134 See, e.g., Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (The Heron II), [1969] 1 A.C. 350, 420 (H.L.) ("If parties enter into the contract with knowledge of some special circumstances, and it is reasonable to infer a particular loss as a result of those circumstances that is something which both must contemplate as a result of a breach. It is quite unnecessary that it should be a term of the contract.") (opinion of Upjohn, L.J.); see also, e.g., CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶ 26-055 (H.G. Beale et al. eds., 29th ed. 2004) ("It is submitted, however, that it is unnecessary to hold that the defendant's assumption of liability for unusual loss (in the special circumstances made known to him) can be enforced only where there is an express or implied term of the contract to that effect; but that it is sufficient if, on the basis of his knowledge of the special circumstances, the reasonable man in the defendant's position at the time of contracting would have understood that, by making the promise in those circumstances, he was assuming responsibility for the risk of the type of loss in question." (footnotes omitted)); 12(1) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND ¶ 1031 (Lord Mackay of Clashfern gen. ed., 4th ed. reissue 1998) ("The contract-breaker's liability for a particular type of loss does not depend on his having expressly or impliedly assented to, or having voluntarily assumed, an obligation to answer for that particular type of loss. Any former principle to that effect is now substantially relaxed."); HARVEY MCGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES ¶ 6-198 (18th ed. 2009) ("it goes too far to require that the defendant's assent to take the risk of the extra liability must be made a term of the contract, for it is then approaching the status of a warranty, and seems dangerously near to destroying the whole doctrine of notice"); Andrew Tettenborn, Hadley v. Baxendale Foreseeability: A Principle Beyond Its Sell-By Date?, 23 J. CONTRACT L. 120, 135-36 (2007) (Austl.) (" [T] he suggestion that a contractor should have to pay damages for a given loss only if she has expressly or impliedly agreed to do so has been severely and rightly questioned, not least because it is implausible, and also arguable because it confuses primary rights (to performance) with secondary rights (to damages if performance is not forthcoming)." (footnote omitted)).
Even Globe Refining's few defenders are rather half-hearted. A good example is Professor McCormick in his treatise on damages. After pointing to Williston and other foes of the tacit agreement test, he commented:
The 'implied agreement' theory, however, if properly ridden, need never carry the court to an unjust result. It adds the fiction of a tacit promise to the original fiction of 'contemplation,' and seldom is there anything in the situation more definite and mandatory than the judge's sense of justice to tell him to find the presence or absence of this silent promise to assume the risk. The recurrent cropping up of the idea in the opinions of the courts indicates that some of the judges have found the conception useful in giving expression to this sense of the justice of the situation. If so, this serves as its justification.
With friends like that . . . MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 141, at 580 (footnotes omitted). 135 See infra notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
world. Beyond that, though, Globe Refining may be weighed in many jurisprudential balances, and is found wanting in all. To establish this in the degree of detail customary in law journals would turn this Essay into an article-a long and tedious article-so perhaps sketching the reasons will suffice here.
First, the tacit agreement test fits badly with theories of contract that take contractual duty seriously. Those theories are antithetical to Holmes's contractas-option-to-perform-or-pay approach, as has already been observed. That which those other contract theories find repellent about Holmes's general approach to contract is precisely what they find repellent about the tacit agreement test. Recall that under Holmes's theory, liability for breach does not arise from a contractual duty to perform but instead from an assumed obligation to perform or pay damages. The promisor must therefore have agreed to be conditionally liable for damages, as distinct from agreeing to perform. Where is this agreement? If the parties made no express agreement, Holmes concluded that they must at least have made an agreement implicitly; after all, mere notice does not ordinarily create contractual liability absent assent. So the tacit agreement test is necessary only because Holmes denied the existence of a contractual duty to perform. Indeed, theories of contract that do put the duty to perform at the core of contracting require that one who breaches that duty be liable for the consequences of the breach, which at least means all foreseeable losses. 136 Holmes tried hard to detach the law from morality, but for those who see a moral component to contract law, looking at duty as little more than the terms of a wager is insupportable. 137 Second, even utilitarian theories of contract commonly reject the tacit agreement test. It might be thought that the economic approach to contract law would find the tacit agreement test congenial. After all, it has derived considerable comfort from Holmes's general view of contracting, which shifts our focus from whether a contract creates a duty to what the consequences of making a contract might be-the sole interest of the Holmesian bad man. But most analysts of contract damages have concluded that the Hadley test is an efficient default term. 138 Under one line of analysis, Hadley is efficient because it minimizes transaction costs by setting forth the liability rule that most parties would prefer were they to have bargained fully about it. Under another, Hadley is efficient because it obliges promisees with uncommon risks to divulge those 136 I say "at least" because some, most importantly Professor Eisenberg, have come out against foreseeability analysis in favor of a tort-like proximate cause test. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REV. 563 (1992) . 137 See, e.g., ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEG-ACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 178 (2000) (summing up the Holmesian approach, but noting that "[i]f our social judgment is that contractual default remains objectionable even when the defaulting party pays damages, the alternative theory of contract is inappropriate. We might better speak of duty."; refers to Pollock as leading exponent of the moralistic position); cf. risks, lest they not shift the liability; the consequence is a contract that takes this uncommon risk into account.
Even those law-and-economics scholars who are not fond of Hadley generally do not think the tacit agreement test is sound. In some cases, the problem with Hadley is not that it is too generous, but that it is too narrow; a fortiori, any further narrowing would make the law even more problematic. In others, Hadley is indeed considered too generous, but not for reasons that favor a tacit agreement test. If, for example, Hadley allows damages inappropriately because of our imperfect and uneven abilities to assimilate information and assess risk, the answer is to look directly at how the risk is priced, or at least at proxies for that, rather than at a non-existent agreement.
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III. THE AFTERMATH OF GLOBE REFINING Holmes's procedural gaffe influenced the law of procedure very little. The Court soon made another foray into reading complaints to determine amounts in controversy. In Smithers v. Smith, 140 the Court was faced with a complaint alleging that the defendants had deprived the plaintiff of land worth $5,000.
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The defendants answered with the argument that the land was worth less than $2,000, the jurisdictional minimum, and that the plaintiff had fraudulently overstated his loss in order to secure federal jurisdiction. 142 The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, stating that the plaintiff had indeed magnified its claim fraudulently and that the losses alleged to have been caused by each individual defendant did not exceed $2,000. 143 The Court in the end held that the plaintiff could sum the claims against the defendants for the purposes of jurisdiction, at least pending the findings of fact at trial. 144 On the way there, it reaffirmed the pre-Globe law that a trial court was not to take the place of the jury in the guise of ruling on jurisdiction. 145 The proper inquiry was whether it would be "legally possible for [the plaintiff] to recover the jurisdictional amount. 146 139 To be sure, Professor Cohen has suggested that Globe Refining should be read as an attempt to limit recovery to market damages in the case of opportunistic behavior by the promisee. Cohen, supra note 30, at 1331-41. This derives some support from the facts of Globe Refining. Certainly Globe Refining's behavior after breach is peculiar, as are its post hoc explanations for that behavior. Ultimately, though, one has to remember that this is a jurisdiction case, not a remedies case. If Globe Refining's arguments for damages are facially not unreasonable, then it is hard to see why it should be kept out of court. There was no doubt, after all, that Globe Refining was entitled to some damages. Time enough to prune away opportunistic claims using standard damages doctrine-under these facts, mitigation comes to mind. 140 Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632 (1907). 141 Id. at 633. 142 Id. 143 Id. at 634. 144 Id. at 646. 145 Id. at 644-45. 146 Id. at 642; cf. Schunk v. Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co., 147 U.S. 500, 504 (1893) ("Although there might be a perfect defense to the suit for at least the amount not yet due, yet the fact of a defense, and a good defense, too, would not affect the question as to what was the amount in dispute.").
What about Globe Refining? The Court did not quite ignore its quite recent decision. It stated, rather, that Globe Refining was merely an application of its earlier holding in Smith v. Greenhow that the damages sought were "beyond a reasonable expectation of recovery, for the purpose of creating jurisdiction." 147 Globe's holding was thus stated as "where the judge of the circuit court, upon sufficient evidence, found that the damages had been claimed and magnified fraudulently beyond the jurisdictional amount, the action should be dismissed."
148 Thus diminished, its citations largely dried up. Indeed, the Court never again referred to Globe Refining for this procedural holding.
And so went the treatises on procedure. For instance, the Foster treatise quoted from earlier referred to Globe Refining in its next edition, but only as an application of the general principle that a court may find facts if jurisdiction is challenged, and may dismiss the case if the damages sought were "purposely and fraudulently magnified." 149 The Foster treatise notably made no reference to Globe Refining in its section on how to determine the value of a dispute in an action for damages. 150 Even more tellingly, a treatise written by the Solicitor General's longtime assistant for questions of procedure devoted seventy-five heavily annotated pages to determining the amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction. Not once did those pages mention Globe Refining.
151 And the treatise's main comment on contract suits flatly contradicts Holmes's approach in Globe Refining:
Mere conjecture or speculation as to the amount of gains or profits lost by an alleged breach of contract may not properly be made the basis of a finding, but if the court cannot affirm that it is impossible to adduce evidence, or sufficient data, to support a fair and reasonable estimate of such amount, it scarcely can be said that a case does not involve the requisite jurisdictional amount, where such estimate is more than [the statutory minimum].
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So Globe Refining was largely ignored by both the courts and the commentators, at least on the jurisdictional issue. Perhaps all concerned recognized it as an aberrant decision and let it fall into desuetude. 153 It does seem to have cut against the Court's overall expansion of diversity jurisdiction and the general federal common law. 153 Note that Globe Refining was one of Holmes's earliest opinions on the Supreme Courthis thirtieth majority opinion, and only the second seriously addressing procedure. It is possible that his relative unfamiliarity with federal procedure led him to issue a relatively wayward opinion, and that his more seasoned colleagues let it pass on the assumption that the procedural aspect would quickly be displaced by opinions more consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence. 154 See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE FULLER COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 178-83 (2003). Holmes's peculiar approach to jurisdiction in Globe Refining is, if nothing else, consistent with his abhorrence of the general federal common law. On the other hand, The Court's quick shelving of Globe Refining's procedural holding does raise a question or two. Globe Refining was unanimous; Smithers had only one dissent, and that without an opinion. So why did this apparent volte-face occasion no comment? At a minimum, one might have expected Holmes-the "Great Dissenter"-to write a few words in Smithers lamenting its sub silentio overruling. The same might have been expected of other members of the Globe Refining court. Two Justices retired and were replaced between Globe Refining and Smithers, hardly enough to explain this apparent reversal. Alternatively, one might expect a member of the Smithers majority to have dissented in Globe Refining, given their very different approaches to jurisdiction. Six justices joined in both opinions. Why their silence?
I have not found correspondence or the like that answers this question squarely. We may, however, speculate plausibly based on the history of the Court. Today, of course, it is the rare opinion of the Court that comes out unadorned with concurrences, dissents, or other such marginalia. But that was not true a century ago. It was not until the 1940s and the Chief Justiceship of Harlan Fiske Stone that the rate of separate opinions jumped up to something approaching modern levels. 155 Both Globe Refining and Smithers were decided by the Fuller Court, which took a very different view of dissent.
Why the rates of dissent were so low until the 1940s has been a fruitful topic for political scientists. Of the many reasons set forth, one seems most pertinent. There was a powerful custom that dissents were reserved for special cases. As Holmes himself put it in his very first Supreme Court dissent, "I think it useless and undesirable, as a rule, to express dissent."
156 As a consequence, very often justices held their noses and joined opinions with which they disagreed.
This was not a rare phenomenon. Lee Epstein and her colleagues have studied the docket books of Chief Justice Waite, Fuller's predecessor, and found a tremendous number of vote changes from the conference to the final opinion-virtually all increasing support for the majority opinion, and most yielding unanimity. Only nine percent of the Waite Court's published opinions generated one or more dissenting votes; in conference, that figure is forty percent.
157 Strikingly, even when more than one justice initially cast minority votes, most of the time the published opinion was nevertheless unanimous. 158 as Professor White has noted, "he did not apply the logic of [his dissents in federal common law cases] to his own 'federal' common law opinions. He cheerfully went about [crafting federal common law opinions] without so much as a nod to relevant state decisions that did not support his position." G. EDWARD 158 With one initial dissenter, the ultimate rate of unanimity was 89%; with two, it was 82%; with three, it was 67%; and, most remarkably of all, even with four dissenters the resulting opinions were unanimous fully 53% of the time. Id. at 366-67.
Robert Post found the same in a study of the Taft Court. In conference only half the votes were unanimous; the resulting opinions were unanimous eighty-six percent of the time. 159 We lack similar data for the Fuller Court, but there is no obvious reason that those justices, most of whom also served on either the Waite Court or the Taft Court, would have behaved differently. Quite the contrary. The rate of dissent was more or less flat from the Waite Court through the Taft Court, though it inched up under Chief Justice Hughes and shot up under Chief Justice Stone. 160 In addition, Chief Justice Fuller was particularly good at coaxing assent, or at least acquiescence, from his colleagues. Holmes commented that "[a]s a presiding officer, Fuller was the greatest Chief Justice I have known." 161 Fuller inherited a tradition of public agreement from his predecessors and was determined to continue it. This he did by dissenting very rarely himself 162 and by encouraging others to accede to the views of the majority, however they might have voted in conference.
Unanimity did not always prevail, but dissents usually were reserved for cases of great import. Whatever Globe Refining was, it was not a major case. For justices inclined to pick their battles, this would be a skirmish worth avoiding. Nor was Smithers all that important, its procedural point aside. Even justices somewhat restive at the custom of unanimity would be reluctant to waste their capital on minor cases. 163 In sum, the issues mangled in Globe Refining simply weren't important enough to stir any justices to dissent. Whatever Holmes's colleagues may have thought about his procedural stumbles, they were not, even in the short run, very important. Nor, when that part of Globe Refining was effectively overturned in Smithers, would Holmes have gotten very worked up; again, the issue was hardly of great moment, and Holmes was not inclined to dissent in run-of-the-mill cases. 164 There is another possibility. Landa Cotton Oil offered a spirited argument that Globe Refining was the villain in this drama-that Globe Refining breached the contract, made wild and unsupported claims for damages, and then made a fraudulent pleading in order to And then there is the unfortunate contract holding. It might not have mattered much if Globe Refining were just another general federal common law decision, swept away like the others by the Erie tsunami. But Globe Refining remains surprisingly influential in both the courts and the commentaries, a phenomenon that warrants a little attention.
First consider the courts. Three jurisdictions, Arkansas, New Mexico, and New York, have expressly made Globe Refining part of their law of foreseeability. 165 Arkansas has done this for over a century. 166 Nor does it show any signs of relenting, though it does note from time to time Arkansas's relative loneliness. 167 New Mexico, on the other hand, has flirted with Globe Refining but has only just tied the knot. In a lengthy opinion rehearsing a long and tangled line of case authority, the New Mexico Court of Appeals recently held that "the only reasonable reading of the cases is that the tests in Hadley and Globe Refining comprise the common law contract damages rule in New Mexico."
168 Perhaps significantly, though, the New Mexico Supreme Court promptly granted certiorari; we may therefore learn that the Court of Appeals tied the knot but the Supreme Court rent it asunder.
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Now for New York. Some pre-Globe Refining New York authority tilted Holmes's way; some did not. 170 After Globe Refining the New York courts continued to waver, as in one Court of Appeals decision that cited approvingly to Globe Refining but then declined to decide whether a tacit agreement was get the resulting lawsuit into federal court. Whether this is true we will never know; the district court decided the case on essentially a bare record, and the affidavits and the like supplied as part of the record on appeal are self-serving. It may be that this transaction just smelled bad to the justices. The case raised messy fact issues and did nothing to advance federal law, so possibly the easiest thing was to get rid of it. After all, Globe Refining would still be able to pursue its claim in state court. This is pure speculation, but it does fit with my informal impression of how courts at times operate. 165 In addition, at least one state's highest court early adopted the tacit agreement test and has not since revisited the issue. Hall v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co 173 Nor has New York recanted, at least not formally. In a recent decision the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Kenford, and with it the tacit agreement test of Globe Refining. 174 Despite this affirmation, however, the court found that consequential damages were recoverable, so it may be that New York's tacit agreement test is, as they say in Texas, all hat and no cattle.
Otherwise, some courts did cautiously make approving references to Globe Refining, though usually in cases in which the actual test didn't much matter. But not long after, those courts made quick U-turns, seldom actually overruling their earlier decisions, but clearly enough rendering them obsolete. And, of course, the Uniform Commercial Code, the Restatements, the treatises, and the commentators overwhelmingly rejected the tacit agreement test. 175 Rejected it, but at least in one spot took account of part of the problem it was put forth to solve.
One of the bases of the tacit agreement test was the idea that no sensible promisor would agree to take on a huge and uncertain risk by accident, but might if it was sufficiently vivid as to bring it to the consciousness of the contracting parties. 176 Baron Alderson suggested in Hadley that, "had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms." 177 The tacit agreement test did not necessarily follow from Baron Alderson's dictum; the parties are free not to provide specifically for a risk, even an obvious risk, if they are content with the default rule of contract. Furthermore, these huge risks are almost always highly improbable. As a result, it would not make sense for the parties to spend much time dickering over a risk allocation. Nevertheless, there is something to this intuition. The likelihood of mispricing this sort of risk is high and the biases associated with this pricing are robust. 178 There may be some value in providing a sort of escape hatch where the parties to a contract have badly mispriced a risk, or perhaps where under the circumstances they are likely to have done so.
One way to get at this problem is through agreement, as Globe Refining attempted. But in the words of Professor Farnsworth, "Such a patent fiction is, however, a poor device to use to gain flexibility." 179 Another is to take aim directly at the risk-to say that even an otherwise foreseeable risk does not pass if the promisor did not receive some sort of premium for taking it on, or if it would systematically have underestimated the magnitude and probability of that risk. A number of decisions after Globe Refining moved in this direction, typically where it was particularly hard to think the promisor, notwithstanding notice, assumed the risk. This idea is more or less embodied in the Restatement (Second)'s disproportionality limit on the recovery of consequential damages. 180 So perhaps Globe Refining had some beneficial effect after allthough, I hasten to note, a benefit far outweighed by the mischief it caused.
IV. GLOBE REFINING AND THE DARK SIDE OF REPUTATION
The judge for whom I clerked once told me a story about his Contracts professor, the great Friedrich Kessler. Kessler had fled from the Nazis some twenty years earlier and had become one of America's leading contracts scholars. One day the class came to a Holmes opinion. Professor Kessler challenged the class to reconcile Holmes's opinion with what they had already learned. Try as they might, the most ingenious and brilliant students in the class couldn't do it. Kessler then smiled and announced to the class in his German-tinged accent, "Ze grrreat Holmes vos WRRRONG!" And which Holmes opinion provoked this comment? On the reasonable assumption that Professor Kessler would have assigned the casebook that he wrote, I looked through the then-current edition for any Holmes opinions set out at length. There were two. One was an unremarkable case on consideration. 181 The other was Globe Refining.
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So vos ze grrreat Holmes wrrrong? Ganz recht. Not only did he do some lasting damage to the law of foreseeability, but he got there only by fouling up the law of jurisdiction.
183 His damage to the law of jurisdiction was transitory at most, thanks to the apparent inclination of Holmes's new colleagues to distinguish Globe Refining away and the willingness of treatise writers to overlook this lapse. 184 But the law of foreseeability bears its Holmesian scars to this day.
180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 183 Globe Refining thus makes an interesting contrast with Carnival Cruise Lines, discussed elsewhere in this Symposium. In Carnival Cruise Lines, Justice Blackmun messed up the law of contracts in order to reach a procedural issue, which he messed up as well. In Globe Refining, Justice Holmes messed up the law of procedure in order to reach a contract issue, which he messed up as well. I am indebted to Chuck Knapp for this observation. 184 This does raise an interesting side issue. To what extent do secondary sources determine whether a judicial opinion becomes important? If all the standard treatises had immediately proclaimed Globe Refining a major change in the law of procedure, would procedure have changed, or would the Court have had to deal more explicitly with Globe Refining in Smithers? Before on-line databases, treatise writers and key-number assigners could make a judi-There are many possible morals to the story of Globe Refining. One I think worth mentioning in this conclusion is that the eminent have louder voices than the rest of us, and sometimes we mistake great volume for great content. Justice Holmes was "grrreat," as Professor Kessler noted. His dicta count for more than the carefully wrought holdings of most of his colleagues. And that can make even his less impressive opinions receive deference well after they otherwise would have fallen into abeyance. 185 Not surprisingly, judicial opinions citing to Globe Refining commonly refer to Holmes's opinion in Globe Refining, not just Globe Refining unadorned. And Globe Refining has considerable staying power, as witness its continuing trickle of citations.
Globe Refining may also exemplify a problem with judges who have axes to grind. With our immersion in the economic analysis of law, Holmes's idea of contract as option is not very strange. When it was issued, however, it was at least unusual, and some would have said bizarre. For Holmes to have a theory of contract was, of course, not a bad thing at all. Nor was it necessarily a bad thing for him to apply that theory in the opinions that he wrote. But in Globe Refining Holmes, apparently determined to put his theory into practice, laid waste to the established law of civil procedure and, for that matter, the law of contracts. Perhaps this shows a certain lack of perspective on Holmes's part, or cial decision all but disappear, at least one not inherently attention-getting. It is less clear that these retain that screening function, thanks to the myriad trawlers of judicial opinions found on the internet. 185 This is not even Holmes's only dubious contracts opinion to survive thanks to this undue deference. In Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874), Holmes held for the court that the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation had no place in the common law of Massachusetts. That court has steadfastly adhered to the holding in Daniels, even after the courts in every other state have long since adopted anticipatory repudiation-indeed, every major civilian legal system, as well as international contract regimes, has done so as well. Even his most ardent admirers will have to admit, I believe, that his influence as a judge-at least in the field of private law-fell far short of being commensurate with his general intellectual stature.").
Daniels v. Newton and Globe Refining both follow from Holmes's general view of contract as a promise either to perform or to pay damages. Globe Refining does so because a less restrictive foreseeability test imposes an obligation in the absence of agreement, express or tacit, and thus suggests that there is a duty to perform. Daniels v. Newton does so because, according to Holmes's approach, deciding not to perform before the time set for performance is merely electing one of the options available to the promisor. Treating that election as a repudiation means that there is something repudiated, presumably something that amounts to a duty perhaps it displays an inclination to slight the specific when speaking in terms of the general. But many bad opinions come about because a judge applies a juridical method without regard to the actual facts and law at issue. Certainly that is true in my field, though limited space and the wish not to antagonize sitting judges oblige me to omit examples. 186 So, then: Is Globe Refining the worst Supreme Court decision of all time? To ask the question is to answer it. Is it the worst Supreme Court contracts decision of all time? Probably not, though it does belong in the Contracts Hall of Shame. It's merely a bad decision, one among many-but one making mischief over a century after it was published, thanks mainly to its deservedly renowned author. The argumentum ad verecundiam is tempting, but fallacious all the same. Globe Refining thus represents a type of bad decision that occurs too often and survives too long. We might do well to read opinions about which we have doubts as though they were written by Justice Whozis, not Judge Stupendous. We might also do well to be skeptical of the judge with a jurisprudential mission; as with other sorts of missionaries, zeal may overcome discretion. In the meantime, Globe Refining totters on. 186 Well, just one, because it is so widely recognized as wrong by remotely serious students of the issue. Judge Easterbrook's opinion in ProCd v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), has become one of the leading cases on the enforceability of terms unavailable to the parties at the time of contracting-in this case, "shrinkwrap" contracts. He held that those terms are enforceable, subject to the usual contract defenses. This would be a perfectly justifiable policy choice, as Judge Easterbrook makes quite clear. But to get there Judge Easterbrook had to deal with the inconvenient language of U.C.C. § 2-207(1), which allows the parties to form a contract in which the acceptance and the offer do not match up. The additional or different terms become part of the resulting contract only under rather narrow circumstances, absent express assent. Judge Easterbrook dealt with this problem, and incidentally with some contrary opinions, by stating that section 2-207 did not apply where there was only one form. Wrong. Wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong. R, O, N, G, wrong. Judge Easterbrook could have made his point outside the judicial arena-he remains an active scholar-or as disapproving dictum in a decision reluctantly applying state law in this diversity action. Instead, he made his point by flagrantly misconstruing the U.C.C, thus fouling up the law, not just in shrinkwrap cases, but in other section 2-207 cases. Indeed, in the face of overwhelming academic criticism Judge Easterbrook seems if anything to have dug in his heels. In IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2008), he applied this identical analysis to a dispute involving a lease of personal property. Just one little problem. Leases of personal property aren't governed by Article Two of the Code; they're governed by Article 2A. And Article 2A has nothing like section 2-207. So Judge Easterbrook-usually an excellent commercial judge-decided this case using a faulty analysis of an inapplicable statute. One would expect better from a judge even with only a fraction of Judge Easterbrook's tremendous ability. But here, alas, we had a judge with a theory, and that theory was going to be applied regardless of its validity or even pertinence.
